From February to May 1997, three devastating earthquakes occurred in rural areas of north and east of Iran. Considering the three consequent earthquakes in bad weather conditions and remoteness of the affected areas, the overall performance of the rescue and relief operations was excellent. In all these earthquakes 95 per cent of people were rescued within first 24 hours and by 48 hours all the affected people were settled in 70,000 tents as temporary shelters. Because of severe winter in north of Iran, reconstruction started one month after the earthquakes and 21,000 new dwellings (out of 29,000 planned) were built before the cold season started. The new seismically designed units are one storey with area of 40 to 60m 2 . The units were built by the owner with free interest loans, subsidized construction material and under government supervision. By July 1997, 1,500 units and by January 1998, 20,000 units were finished and people were moved in. The overall evaluation of the rescue operation to reconstruction process is satisfactory and the lessons learned during the Manjil earthquake were useful and played a key role in this success. This reconstruction method now so far proved to be successful in rural areas and can be used in future in order to save time, money and reduce social consequences. Gives a brief description of these earthquakes from seismological and structural point of view, evaluation of the rescue and relief operation and reconstruction programme.
Introduction
Iran being located in the active AlpineHimalayan seismic belt is an earthquake prone country that has experienced more than 130 strong earthquakes with a magnitude of 7.5 or more in the past centuries. In this century alone, 20 large earthquakes have claimed more than 100,000 lives, destroyed many towns and thousands of villages, and caused extensive economic damage. Recent earthquakes in Iran i.e. Manjil-Rudbar (June 1990, m Figure 1 shows the location of these earthquakes. In all these earthquakes, human and economic losses have been due to the failure of structures that for the most part were incompatible with the level of earthquake hazard in Iran. To control the seismic risk, a comprehensive earthquake hazard reduction programme has launched in Iran since 1991, one year after the devastating earthquake of Manjil-Rudbar. This programme has had a good achievement and impact on earthquake hazard mitigation and public awareness as well as on the earthquake research programmes in Iran (see Ghafory-Ashtiany and Eslami, 1997) .
Disaster management system in Iran
Based on 1991 law, the Natural Disaster Headquarter (NDH) under the Ministry of Interior with the full authority is responsible for policy, guidance, supervision, co-ordination of the disaster management or post disaster activities including rescue and relief operations, temporary settlement and reconstruction with the co-operation of all the respected government agencies. More specifically, the direct executive responsibilities under this supervision are: Considering the coverage and extent of natural disaster, they are categorized in three levels: National, Regional and Local, respectively, with the management of minister, province governor and local governor. In many cases the NDH manager acts as minister.
Rescue and relief
For 72 hours after the occurrence of a disaster, all the related government agencies, Red Crescent, some divisions of armed forces, transportation, etc. will be under the command of the NDH manager. For example, for a national level event, under the direct command of Minister of Interior, the required armed force, air and land transportation, and emergency supplies should be provided for rapid rescue operation. This system which was developed and based on experience gained from the Manjil-Rudbar earthquake of 1990 and eight years of rescue operations during the war, is very flexible and gives all the necessary authority to the minister or governor for the rescue and relief operation. Also for each province, neighbouring (sister) provinces have been designated for despatching aids and rescue teams if it becomes necessary. The Red Crescent branch in each city varies in the size, type and the level of hazard stores and appropriate amount of emergency supplies. Red Crescent is responsible for providing the emergency supplies to the affected people for a maximum period of 45 days. However, some times they go beyond that and continue until the situation becomes stable. This system which so far has worked satisfactorily needs improvement, optimization and modification based on a scientific approach rather than just on practical or executive experiences. In this system there is no specific written strategy for each type of scenario. Therefore flexibility is required for the many unknowns and surprises that might happen during and after an earthquake. For example in most of the earthquake prone cities the vulnerability assessment has not been performed and disaster authorities do not have sufficient and reliable information on whether or not the city hospitals and other relief facilities can survive the earthquake. In other words most disaster relief centres are not specifically built for and their staff are not trained for a post disaster operation. With all this, only over capacity and beyond duty work of the people in the damaged areas made the rescue and relief operation in the past earthquakes a success. Therefore in these types of system the NDH manager (at all levels) needs the flexibility and authority to adjust the rescue operation based on the disaster situation as it has been done in the past.
Temporary settlement
After the end of rescue and the relief operation of Manjil, Lordegan, Darab, Sefidabeh earthquakes, prefabricated shelters with 12 to 20 m 2 were provided by government to each family during the reconstruction period. Living in these units might be acceptable for short periods, in good weather conditions and urban areas, but cannot fulfil people's need for a long time and consequently add social problems. In the long term people start to add some part to the shelter either to compensate for the shortage of space, or protect themselves against the bad weather (Plate 1). This kind of living condition was very hard and has created many social and cultural problems especially when the reconstruction was prolonged for two to three years or even more as it has happened in the past. Overall evaluation showed that the temporary settlement not only creates social and economic problems, but also prolongs the reconstruction period and thus it was not a very successful experience. Temporary shelter can be good for urban living and in a camp form with appropriate infrastructure but not for rural areas. Beside these, temporary shelters can cost up to one-third of the permanent dwelling, which means a waste of money in the long term.
Reconstruction
To achieve aseismic structure after reconstruction of a damaged area, the following principles should be considered and adhered to by the Housing Foundation or Ministry of Housing and Urban Development as responsible organizations in the reconstruction of the damaged areas: (1) Site selection. To designate or locate an adequate site for reconstruction; local geology, seismotectonic, seismicity, geotechnic, site effect, socio-economic and cultural aspects should be taken into consideration. The relocation of a village or a town should be done if the existing site causes or poses great danger to the reconstruction. If a landslide or being close to a fault line cannot be prevented, relocation is permissible. (2) Aseismic design. All new structures should be designed against earthquake with the consideration of earthquake hazard and environmental condition of the region. In this regard, Housing Foundation designed five types of dwelling for reconstruction purpose which are:
• concrete frame with arch roof to be used in the hot climate; • concrete frame with flat jack-arch roof to be used mainly in the cold climate; • steel frame with flat jack-arch roof to be used in any environment; • concrete frame with sloped timber roof; and • timber frame to be used in Bojnoord area. Figure 2 shows the layout and some of the details of the most commonly constructed units which was concrete frame with flat and arch roof. Even though the overall design is acceptable, some deficiencies such as improper foundation, connection design can be observed. (3) Construction material. The quality and environmental compatibility of the construction material is an important element in an earthquake resistant structure. Considering the remoteness of the damaged area (in most cases) and accessibility to the technical people as well as policy of maximum participation of the affected people in reconstruction of their homes; high quality and accessible construction material should be used in order to assure aseismic construction. For example, if good concrete material (sand, gravel, water and cement) cannot be obtained or is expensive in the vicinity of the damaged area, the use of a concrete frame structure should be avoided and the structure should be designed using steel or prefabricated members. There should not be any restriction on choosing the most suitable material. (4) Construction. The construction work of the designed dwelling should be done either by certified construction companies or by trained people under the direct supervision of certified engineers. For the sole purpose of people participation one should not allow untrained people to build their home. (5) Quality control and supervision. Quality control and supervision of all the abovementioned principals is the key element to successful reconstruction. From 1978 to 1990 after the Tabas (1978 , Ghaen (1980) , Golbaf (1981) and Manjil (1990) , the damaged cities and villages were reconstructed with different policies and engineering designs. However, in the two cases of Golbaf and Ghaen, the re-occurrence of earthquakes in May 1997 and March 1998, respectively, was an actual test and engineering evaluation of these reconstructions. As it was expected these tests showed different responses. In case of Ghaen, after the earthquake, the responsible organization built ductile moment resisting concrete frame with masonary infill. Since Ghaen is located in the hot desert land, in order to protect the homes against high temperature, the wall and roof were built too thick and heavy for insulation purpose as can be seen in Plate 2. The majority of these housing units and schools) were totally destroyed due to magnitude 6.6 earthquake and created sorrowful scenes. The bad and improper design (strong beam-weak column and heavy roof) as well as poor workmanship and lack of supervision and quality control caused the tragedy. Plate 3 clearly shows the type of damage. In some cases adobe houses had less damage than the "so called" engineering buildings. In Ghaen region not only these buildings but others that were supposed to be constructed according to the seismic code of Iran, were destroyed or slightly damaged, see Plate 4. In an overall evaluation, the reconstruction of Ghaen was a failure and was the main cause of large number of casualties during the Ardekul earthquake of 1997. People thought that they were living in earthquake proof housing. This performance made people not trust the engineering structures and thus they did not cooperate very well in the recent reconstruction programme as it will be explained in Section 5.5. In the case of Golbaf (500km west of Ghaen) the experience was quite different. As it was reported by Maheri (1998) and in Plate 5 all of the reconstructed buildings after 1981 earthquake survived with minor damages in the March earthquake. The main damage was done to adobe houses and some exterior walls outside the living units. Owing to the good reconstruction 1,500 deaths in 1981 were reduced to five people in 1991 considering that the earthquake happened at night, and most people were in their homes. The design of reconstructed units in Golbaf was similar to the Ghaen. The difference was due to good workmanship, supervision and people being conscious of building safer structures.
Reconstruction experiences
The reconstruction of Manjil-Rudbar also requires detailed discussion due to its coverage as well as variations. Totally 200,000 units in Gilan and Zanjan provinces (mainly in Rudbar, Manjil and Loshan) were reconstructed or repaired under the supervision and guidance of the Housing Foundation with people's co-operation and with subsidized construction material and free interest loans. Most of the structures which were steel frame with bracing and good foundations were designed and constructed according to the Iran seismic code (2800). Plate 6 shows various reconstructed units. The author has seen good quality as well as bad and some extremely over-designed. The major lifeline systems were repaired, restored and upgraded in less than a year and completed within two years, see Ghafory-Ashtiany (1998) for performance and restoration of lifeline and industrial facilities in Manjil-Rudbar area. It took almost three years for the reconstruction to be completed. The overall evaluation is satisfactory and only time can judge the actual quality.
Tabas reconstruction started in 1979 by government using modern design, materials and construction techniques and in some locations prefabricated units, which were incompatible with the living condition and Tabas climate. Also since the earthquake happened during the revolution many volunteer groups have entered into the region to build houses for damaged people and especially for the poor ones. In total 5,334 units were reconstructed including 2,436 in the city of Tabas, 2,774 in villages, 24 schools and 103 offices and workplaces. Most of units in the villages were made of concrete frames with concrete block infills and dome shape roofing systems similar to the one shown in Figure 2 and Plate 5. In one of the villages prefabricated units similar to the space type of building were reconstructed. Since these buildings were not compatible to their life style, many of them left these so called "modern homes" and used them as storage or as animal sheds and they repaired their damaged houses for their living spaces. Most units built in the city of Tabas were made of reinforced masonry with flat or arch type of jack arch system (Figures 2b and 2h) . The reconstruction took four and half years to be completed. Even though the newly built units were earthquake resistant, they were not adequate for the Tabas environment. However a new understanding was created after the earthquake and that was to build their homes safer than before. After the reconstruction period 5,500 more units were built either with steel or concrete frames. It has been reported that most of the buildings were safer after the earthquakes and people kept the ruins as a memory of prevention Plate 7 shows some of the scenes of the reconstructed buildings and the memorial of the earthquake.
Reconstruction policy in recent earthquakes
With the purpose of saving time, money and reducing the socio-economic and cultural impact of an earthquake and permanent settlement of the affected people, government decided to eliminate the temporary settlement phase and has started the reconstruction phase with maximum participation of the people and financial support of the government. In Iran, the Housing Foundation (semi-governmental organization) is responsible for the rehabilitation and construction of low cost housing in rural areas as well as the reconstruction of rural areas after a natural disaster. Their reconstruction experience in Manjil-Rudbar was acceptable.
Based on the above-mentioned policy, the Housing Foundation became responsible for the reconstruction of the damaged areas. Government allocated 300 billion Rials (170 million dollars) for the construction of 29,024 new units. This budget would cover the cost of site selection studies, design, construction material delivery, supervision, training, 8 million Rials ($4,600) for free interest loan for the construction of each unit as well as 4 million Rials ($2,300) direct help after completion of the units. Considering the interest of the loans, direct help and other implemented cost in an overall estimate, government pays almost half of the construction cost of each dwelling. Also government allocated enough budget for the quick restoration of lifeline systems and many new development projects (schools, hospital, roads, communication, etc.) to improve living standards and create jobs.
Thus considering this wide and fast reconstruction operation in a nine-month period with the participation of untrained people, perfect aseismic reconstruction was hard to achieve. In this regard, as it will be discussed in Section 6, some deficiencies have been observed. However, the overall assessment was satisfactory and one hopes that in the near future this approach improves. In this regard IIEES is developing a more systematic approach for the reconstruction of the rural areas to eliminate the problem experienced during the reconstruction of these earthquakes.
Bojnoord Earthquake
In the cold afternoon (14:08) of 4 February 1997 a relatively strong earthquake with a M s = 6.1, M w = 6.4, PGA = 0.3g and intensity of VIII shook a large area (200km as far as Mashad) in the north of Khorasan province (northeast of Iran). This earthquake was preceded by a foreshock of magnitude 5.4 at 13:24 (44 minutes before the main shock) that helped in reducing the number of casualties resulting from the main event. The epicentre was 25km northeast of the city of Bojnoord with a population of 100,000. This earthquake had several hundred aftershocks, of which the strongest one had a magnitude of 5.7 and occurred on the next day. In this earthquake 90 died; 1,948 injured; 12,717 houses in 61 villages in Shiravan and 122 villages in Bojnoord area, 1,639 houses in Bojnoord and Shiravan; and water and power supply of 31 villages experienced considerable damage. From the damaged houses, 6,040 units were damaged more than 60 per cent. The total direct economic damage was 175 billion Rials (100 million dollars).
Structural damage
Most of the damage occurred amongst village adobe houses built on steep slopes. For example in a village located 10km from the epicentre all of the adobe houses had completely collapsed, the only two-storey reinforced concrete school building in the village survived the earthquake with about 30 per cent induced damage (Plate 8). In Bojnoord with recorded PGA of 0.2g, none of the houses or governmental buildings collapsed, except many of them experienced shear cracks and some minor connection failures. The extent of damage and destruction to onestorey village houses indicates the high frequency content of this earthquake which is compatible with the stiff and rock-like nature of the area's soil.
Except for the petro-chemical facility that is located about 15km from the epicentre, no other vital facility was in the affected area. Although no significant damage occurred in this facility during the earthquake, its operation was halted for several days after the main shock. There were a few steel and concrete bridges within the 30 to 40km radius of the epicentre which had experienced no observable damage. There was minor damage to the water supplies system owing to the breakage of non polyethylene pipes.
Rescue operation
Owing to the extent of the event, this earthquake was classified as a national disaster so the Minister of Interior commanded the rescue operation. All the necessary supplies were dispatched from Mashad (capital of Khorasan province) and from the neighbouring provinces. At 7 p.m. the state disaster management meeting was held at Bojnoord in the presence of the NDH manager. Within 24 hours all of the affected people were rescued and settled in the tent provided by the Red Crescent. Power supplies were resumed within six hours, so that in the night of the event there was no blackout. Due to the cold weather of February, the tents, fuel, blankets and heaters were provided immediately. Nobody stayed helpless even in the first cold night of the event. Within eight hours after the quake, a 35 member medical team was present and most of the badly injured people were transferred to the Mashad hospitals. Next day the main demand of the people was to save their livestock.
Reconstruction
Reconstruction of the Bojnoord earthquake consisted of two parts: lifeline, infrastructures and residential dwellings. There was no major damage to the lifeline system and industrial facilities. However within a short period 75km of the secondary roads were repaired and 70km of new secondary roads which were needed for smooth reconstruction were built. Schools, agricultural and small industrial units were reconstructed within one year after the earthquake. The 231km of water supplies pipeline as well as power supplies were repaired and restored in a short time after the earthquake. By April 1997 the reconstruction of the 6,312 units started and by mid November 5,114 units were completed and by end of the year all of the people moved into their new houses. Most of the dwellings which were built in this area were concrete frame with slope timber roofs and flat jack-arch roofs. In one village steel frames and in three villages timber structures were used. A total of 165 new development projects started and by March 1998 they had 80 per cent physical improvements.
Overall evaluation shows that the speed of reconstruction and people's co-operation was excellent, however some deficiency was seen in the quality of the constructed building Plate 8 A view of a destroyed village. The only engineered two-storey school building survived which will be explained later since this was common in the three cases.
Ardebil earthquake
Twenty-four days after the Bojnoord earthquake in the very cold afternoon (16:27) of 28 February, 1997 a relatively strong earthquake with m b = 5.5, M s = 6.2, M w = 7.2 , PGA = 0.2g and intensity of VII + shook a large area in the Ardebil province in Northwest of Iran. This earthquake had more than 100 aftershocks of which the strongest measured a magnitude of 5.2. Due to this earthquake 954 died; more than 2,600 injured; and 13,500 houses, 49 health centres, 19 PTT offices and 600 classrooms were destroyed in 112 villages. No substantial damage was observed in lifeline systems, except slight damage to 347km of secondary roads; 218km of power lines; and 60km of water pipelines. The total direct economic loss was 230 billion Rials (132 million dollars).
Structural damages
The buildings in the damaged area included residential homes, stables, schools, and in some cases medical centres and other governmental offices. In general, most of the nonengineered adobe houses that were made by locals suffered the heaviest damage Those that were at least semi-engineered or were made of bricks with cemented mortar behaved relatively better and maintained their integrity in most of our observations. Almost all of the death toll may be related to the collapse of the adobe houses. Another common type of structural system was unreinforced masonry bearing walls (vertical load carrying component) with flat jack-arched steel roofing systems. See Kazem et al. (1998) for the behaviour of this type of structure against earthquake. It was observed in many instances that these roofing systems lack the necessary resistance against earthquake motion and collapse especially in the region where they meet the non-bearing walls parallel to the joists (Plate 9).
All of the engineered structural systems that were built out of steel or concrete did not experience any noticeable damage from this earthquake. Also, there was no report of any major damages to lifeline facilities nor was observed by the IIEES reconnaissance team.
Rescue operation
The earthquake happened in a very cold period (-30°to -20°C) and mainly in the mountain villages that were covered by snow and hard to access. The event was classified as a regional disaster, so the governor of Ardebil with the help of NDH manager in Tehran coordinated the rescue and relief operation. Since the event happened around sunset and it was hard to access the damaged area even with a helicopter, the local people with the help of around 2,000 volunteer mountain climbers started the rescue operation throughout the night in the accessible villages. By sunrise of the next day a massive rescue operation (air and land) continued the rescue and relief work in such a way that by the next sunset more than 97 per cent of the people were rescued. Red Crescent set up tents around villages and distributed warm foods. However, owing to the heavy snow and cold weather which caused the closure of the secondary roads, all of the people in the high mountain villages were relocated and resettled in Sarein and Ardebil. The serving of warm food and relief period continued for one month. Due to the cold weather people were forced to protect their tent by supplementary and water proof material as can be seen in Plate 10. Water and power supplies were restored within five days and schools were set up within one month after the quake as can be seen in Plate 11.
Reconstruction
Based on the site selections studies, from 112 damaged villages, nine were relocated, 11 were expanded for future development and one (Tajragh) was relocated for environmental reasons. Due to the environmental condition, concrete frame structures with jack-arch roofing systems (Plate 1) were selected. Only in one village, steel frames were used instead of concrete frames and generally were better constructed. Besides the repair of the damaged roads, restoration of water and power supplies and construction of new schools, 12,945 units of housing were constructed within nine months after the earthquake. Also 220 development projects started in the damaged area, 50 per cent of which relate to the lifeline systems. Plate 12 shows different stages of reconstruction.
Overall evaluation shows good participation and co-operation of the people in reconstruction process, resulting in a very fast settlement of the affected people. The quality of the built units are better than the GhaenBirjand areas; however due to the lack of proper supervision and quality control some deficiencies have been observed. Also the type of houses that were proposed for reconstruction were not compatible with the climate of Ardebil (cold winter and high wind) and thus people made some minor modifications and added some wind protection walls (Plate 13) to adjust their homes to the Ardebil climate.
Ardekul (Ghaen-Birjand) earthquake
Seventy-two days after the Ardebil earthquake at noon (12:27) of 10 May, 1997 a strong earthquake with M s = 7.1, m b = 6.6, PGA = 0.7g and intensity of IX + shook a large area in the southern part of the Khorasan province in Ghaen and Birjand area. The epicentre was located about 100km northeast of the city of Birjand (population 450,000) and its rupture line extended more than 100km. The intensity of shaking was so much that the earthquake was felt in cities as far as 500 kilometres away from the epicentre. This earthquake had several hundred aftershocks, as high as 5.5. Owing to this earthquake 1,568 died; 2,600 injured; 72,000 people became homeless; 141 schools, 55 health centres, banks, and 17,630 houses in 259 villages (10,427 in Ghaen, 5,232 in Birjand, 1,971 in the Khaf region) experienced between 20 to 100 per cent damage. Also 74 small co-operative factories and businesses as well as 217 work places or shops were destroyed. Loss of 42,000 cattle and damage to the 7,800 acres of farming land had great impact on the people's economy and jobs. The total direct economic damages were 265 billion Rials (148 million Dollars). A total of 30 per cent of the economic loss consisted of the infrastructures.
Geotechnical
Site effects were very vivid in this earthquake. Generally, in the close vicinity of the main fault most of the villages were 100 per cent damaged and the extent of damage became less and less as one moved away from it. In some places, even very close to the main fault, one could see two villages -one with 100 per cent and the other one with 30 per cent damage. In some cases the site effects had adverse effects on the buildings as can be seen in Plate 14. Most of the slope instabilities and sliding occurred along steep slopes, road banks and unprotected river banks in a radius of about 10km from the earthquake source. Liquefaction phenomenon was not a big problem in this earthquake because the depth and extent of liquifiable soil layers in this area was negligible and it was only limited to river valleys. The earthquake caused many huge rockfalls and massive landslides which in many instances closed the access roads and slowed down the emergency aid activities.
Structural damage
Most of the buildings in the affected region are one-storey which can be divided into four major categories: (1) Newly built buildings based on the 1989 seismic code. (2) Buildings that were designed to resist only the gravitational forces. (3) One-storey RC frames that were reconstructed after 1979 earthquake in Ghaen. (4) Adobe houses.
The behaviour of category (1) buildings varied from satisfactory to very unsatisfactory. In the same intensity region (IX + ) there were buildings that were completely damaged (Plate 4) and on the other hand there were buildings that behaved very well with almost no structural damage. For the former case, in most instances construction and detailing errors such as poor connection details, discontinuities in the 3-D behaviour of lateral system, long cantilevers, etc. were the main factors responsible for the bad seismic behaviour. Category (2) buildings experienced extensive damage mainly due to the rotation of the exterior load-bearing walls and the subsequent partial or total collapse of the floor diaphragm. In these types of buildings Plate 13 Modification of the design for protection of the building against wind and cold weather Plate 14 Different damage to the similar building due to the site effect no load paths are considered for the transfer of lateral loads. For example no positive connections of floor diaphragm to exterior loadbearing walls exist or floor diaphragms cannot transfer the lateral loads due to lateral torsional buckling of the floor beams, etc. Category (3) buildings are really a special kind of category (2) buildings. These buildings as it was explained in section 2.4 were mostly destroyed. Village adobe houses experienced considerable damage throughout the region. These houses are inherently heavy and very weak against earthquake forces. For example, in villages within 10km from Ardekul, most of the adobe houses had completely collapsed. However in some cases due to site effect some traditional adobe houses had only the slightest damage (Plate 14).
As for the industrial and lifeline systems, fortunately, this powerful earthquake occurred in a sparsely populated area and only two major industrial and power generation facilities were situated and did not experience any noticeable damage. A small sugar producing plant east of Birjand was severely damaged mainly due to components failure. There were few steel and concrete bridges just to the east of Birjand and Ghaen, intensity V region, and none of them experienced any observable damage. Also, the water and power distribution systems of the villages experienced moderate damage during the earthquake. A total of 50 power substations and 405km of power distribution network were damaged mainly owing to the fall of power line as can be seen in Plate 15. The traditional irrigation system known as ghanat (shallow wells linked by a horizontal canal connecting the bottom of the wells) in 60 villages was damaged. Within 48 hours the major power lines were restored and at least temporary water tanks were installed in all of the affected villages.
Rescue operation
Immediately after the earthquake and before any command from the NDH, the governors of Ghaen and Birjand with the help of local authority started the rescue operation. Considering that this earthquake occurred in Khorasan province and it was after the Bojnoord earthquake and flood in its central part, the Red Crescent was faced with huge shortages of supplies. Also since the affected area was located in the south part of desert, all of the access roads to the region ended up in dead ends, which meant there was only one access road to the region. Thus help was provided mainly by air and land from neighbouring provinces as well as directly from Tehran. The extent of this earthquake was such that was classified as a National disaster so the minister of interior took the rescue operation in control. The NDH manager after the organization of the rescue and relief operation in Tehran flew to the region and continued management from Ghaen. Besides Red Crescent, 5,000 volunteer relief workers, army and para-military forces assisted in the relief operation. Within 28 hours after the event 8,500 tents with immediate supplies were distributed to all the people who had had their houses completely destroyed. After the aftershock 24,500 tents were set up in the region. Within this time 67,000 blankets, 11,000 heaters, 12,500 lanterns, 16,900 water jerry cans, 21,000 shoes, 75,000 million tons of foods, etc. were distributed. Plate 16 shows the continuation of life in Ardekul and Esfeden (intensity IX + ). Power and water supplies were restored immediately within 36 hours after the earthquake. Also international help with the coordination of UNDP office in Iran were sent to the region by 68 planes from 23 countries carrying 2,000 million tons of relief supplies. Most of the foreign help with approximate value of 11 million dollars, even though it was appreciated, was more political than toward the immediate need of the affected people. With the consideration of all the above mentioned points the rescue operation was very good and quick.
Reconstruction
Most of water, power and communication systems as well as schools, health centres were repaired and reconstructed within 11 months after the earthquake. Many damaged roads due to the earthquake as well as heavy construction traffic were repaired. Also new roads such as Ghaen-Zirkooh and Gezik were also built in the region for future development. Beside the lifeline restoration and reconstruction of houses, 456 development projects are underway in the region with 60 per cent improvement by March 1998. Similar to other damaged areas, it was planned that 9,667 units with concrete frame and arched roofs as shown in Figure 2 to be reconstructed before the winter of 1998. Owing to the many problems and lack of people co-operation the reconstruction of the houses was slow in this region in such a way that by November of 1997, only 2,564 units were completely constructed. The reconstruction experience and people co-operation was different in this region. People had a bad experience from the previously reconstructed units after the 1980 Ghaen earthquake since most of the people lost their lives in these units. Also because of negative comments from various specialists, they did not cooperate very well. Plate 17 shows the early stage of reconstruction in Hajiabad. Comparing the detail with the design shown in Figure  2 clearly shows the poor quality of construction which was due to poor supervision and lack of training. Also Figure 3 shows the sieve analysis of sand with sand equivalent of 55 per cent which was used for concrete material in one of the areas. Fortunately with the notice of the author to the Housing Foundation, the problem was resolved. So with all the problems that existed in this region, the reconstruction is still underway and it is hoped that it can be finished with acceptable quality before 1999 winter.
Conclusions and comments
The present system of rescue and relief operations which benefit from full authority and flexibility, has been successful for moderate earthquake and flood in rural areas. However for a large earthquake or a disaster in an urban area it is not sufficient. A more systematic approach and preparedness with the benefit of flexibility is required. The following are some comments and recommendations:
• Past excellent experiences should be used in improving the existing disaster management systems.
• Training of all of the personnel and organization involved in the rescue and relief operation is highly recommended and needed.
• Hospitals and emergency relief centres should be strengthened against possible earthquakes in such a way that they remain operational after the earthquakes. They
Plate 16 Ardekul and Esfeden (Ghaen area) eight days after the earthquake should also have preparedness programme for different scenarios. For example, most of the hospitals that were constructed before 1984 and some recent ones are highly vulnerable to earthquakes and they are not prepared for earthquakes.
• Distribution of goods and emergency supplies should be done so that every body gets appropriate and equal supplies with special attention to the old and more needy people.
• Farmers are highly dependent on their livestock, so the agriculture departments should enter into the force in the shortest possible time for rescuing the livestock and saving farm products.
• Damaged people not only need shelter, food and emergency supplies, but they also need mental help. So clergies, psychologists and social workers need to be present in the earthquake damaged area to answer to the need of the people in order to eliminate or reduce stress and depression. • A comprehensive disaster management programme considers full participation of the people in all stages of relief operation. Training and preparing the people in the earthquake prone area for a possible event is very useful in post disaster operation. So IIEES public education programmes should be further expanded and implemented in the country.
Reconstruction of the housing in the affected areas of these earthquakes can be assessed from a different angle. From the point of socio-economic and cultural aspects they were a success since with minimum relocation and fast reconstruction, people after a short period were moved into their permanent houses and government did not face immigration and unemployment. However, from the Figure 3 Sieve analysis of the sand that was used in making concrete in one of the villages technical point of view one can assess these newly built environments from the principles that were mentioned in Section 2.3: • Comprehensive studies were not performed in site selection and were based mainly on geological observation and socio-economic and cultural aspects.
• There were several problems in design (Figure 2 ) which the Housing Foundation claims were corrected. In many cases their correction was not implemented. For example the improper connection (foundation to column) design can cause structural failure as happened in the past.
• Owing to the lack of accessibility to clean sand and gravel and not close supervision, in some cases sand with more than 10 per cent clay and silt was distributed and used to make concrete. The use of steel or other prefabricated material is recommended.
• Owing to the lack of planned training of the people and absence of foremen in all the places and all the time, bad workmanship was observed.
• Quality control and supervision was poor.
The management was mainly concentrated on providing the construction material and budget and the regional engineers did not play a role in the reconstruction. The comment and complaint of the author to the authorities and to the President and consequent strong order of the President made the executive bodies adhere to the correct practice of reconstruction.
